Washington Naval Agreements (1921-22)
The ONI was founded in 1882 and has already served as the “leading provider of foreign fleet data” to U.S. politicians on the eve of the conference.7 As with the rest of the U.S. Navy, the First World War resulted in a significant increase in the ONI workforce, which until 1918 was swelled on 306 reservists and 18 public servants.8 , military, marine, economic and industrial” information to “analyze” this information to gather and make available” and to disseminate it “systematically throughout the service of the navy”. 9 Article XIX of the Treaty also prohibits Britain, Japan and the United States from building new fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. Existing fortifications in Singapore, the Philippines and Hawaii could be preserved. This was an important victory for Japan, as the newly fortified British or American bases would be a serious problem for the Japanese in the event of a future war. This provision of the treaty essentially guaranteed that Japan would be the dominant power in the Western Pacific and was instrumental in Japan`s acceptance of the limits of shipbuilding.  At the end of the First World War, the British still had the largest navy above water, but their large ships were becoming obsolete, and the Americans and Japanese quickly built new, expensive warships. Britain and Japan were allied in a treaty that was due to expire in 1922.
Although there were no immediate risks, observers have increasingly pointed to the U.S.-Japan rivalry for control of the Pacific Ocean as a long-term threat to world peace. At that time, the British decided that it was better for them to cast their fate with Washington than with Tokyo. In order to end an unnecessary, costly and potentially dangerous arms race, major countries have signed a series of disarmament agreements at sea.  Between November 1921 and February 1922, representatives of nine nations met in Washington, D.C., to discuss security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and naval disarmament.1 The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) played a crucial role for the U.S. conference organizers by gathering information and publishing intelligence products that support U.S. negotiators and enable them to achieve U.S. diplomatic objectives. Although the conference has a bad historical reputation because it failed to prevent the navy`s arms race before World War II, its more modest achievements present a case study for successful diplomatic intelligence, with the ONI`s support for negotiation efforts demonstrating the importance of maritime intelligence. The idea that the British Empire was paralyzed by the Washington agreement because of the limitation of arms at the conference does not seem to me to be justified. Britain has not been able to maintain its plan to build its own navy.
It was forced to abandon the idea of an independent and specific Asian naval force of any size because it was too expensive. It could not afford to build more capital ships that went beyond what it was ending the Great War, plus one or two (z.B Rodney). The First World War had already led the nation to bankruptcy. It was already stealing Peter to pay Paul. What the maritime agreement did was conceal the gradual degradation of the greatest individual and guardian weapon of empires. And it also slowed down the growing power of the United States, which would soon become inexorable with World War II. The Empire was already lost before 1922. The Washington Navy Treaty, also known as a five-power contract, was a treaty signed in 1922 among the great nations that had won World War I, which declared itself ready to prevent an arms race by limiting shipbuilding.